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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals 
by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(c) and Rule 3 of the Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
the Judgment entered by the Eighth Circuit Court for the State of Utah, Utah 
County, Provo Department, Judge E. Patrick McGuire presiding. Judgment was 
granted upon BirdsT Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court correctly hold that Mills1 remedies of Birds' 
breach of contract is limited to enforcement of a forfeiture of the property? 
2. Did the lower court correctly award attorneysT fees to Birds 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
MillsT statement of the nature of this case is accurate except in the 
following respect: 
Mills claimed in their objection to BirdsT findings of fact and in their 
appellate brief that certain facts were stipulated to in presenting the cross-
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motions for summary judgment. Such was not the case and was pointed out by 
Birds in their response to Mills1 objection to their proposed findings of fact. 
The Court ruled on the cross-motions for summary judgment based on the 
affidavits of Birds and their counsel that were unopposed by Mills. The factual 
allegations of those affidavits were set forth verbatim in the findings of fact. 
The only one added was the CourtTs own finding that Mills1 action was brought 
in bad faith and that Birds were entitled to attorneys fees. 
The courtTs conclusions of law determined that the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract eliminated all remedies for default except forfeiture and the Mills1 
action for damages should be dismissed. In addition, the court concluded that 
the Birds were entitled to a judgment for attorneys' fees against Mills based 
upon the findings of fact. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Case Below. 
Mills1 statement of the course of proceedings and disposition of the case 
below is accurate except where it indicates that the facts set forth in the 
affidavit of Dean S. Bird and Julie A. Bird were stipulated to for any indication 
that all facts set forth in all affidavits (including that of Birds1 attorney) were 
not stipulated to. In fact, there was no stipulation of facts but the Court found 
facts based on the unopposed affidavits of Birds and their counsel. Mills* also 
indicate that the Court denied both motions for summary judgment when it 
ordered the matter set forth trial. Such is not established by the record. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
The statement of facts is most simply presented by review of the findings 
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of fact of the Court v/hich was a verbatim quotation of the two unopposed 
affidavits of Birds and their counsel except for the finding of the Court that 
Mills claim was brought in bad faith and Birds were entitled to attorneys fees. 
The statement of facts presented in Mills' brief follows the findings of fact to a 
certain extent but adds some others favorable to Mills which the Court did not 
find nor were presented by Mills and left out several findings of fact v/hich 
supported the CourtTs judgment against Mills. A true statement of facts follows 
as was found by the Court upon the unopposed affidavits: 
1. On or about October 1, 1981, Mills entered into a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract (the Contract) with Birds. 
2. At the time the Contract was signed by the parties paragraph 16 had 
been stricken and the notation made in the margin with reference to Escrow 
Instructions. 
3. Mills designated Zion National Title, Inc., to prepare the above 
documents. 
4. The only conversation or communication that Birds had with Mills 
prior to signing the above documents was a meeting with Mr. Mills several weeks 
prior to signing contracts and it was not concerning the documents themselves 
but the general terms of the transaction, not including the remedies of the 
Seller in the event of default. 
5. The Contract and Escrow Instructions were signed by Mills outside 
Birds' presence and there was no communication or discussion between Mills and 
Birds at that time. 
6. After Mills signed the documents, they were delivered to Birds at 
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their home by Mike Hallock of Zion National Title, Inc., for signing at which 
time they signed them. At the time Mike Hallock of Zion National Title, Inc., 
brought the documents to Birds' home to sign them, there was no conversation, 
discussion or other communication between Birds and Mr. Hallock regarding the 
striking of paragraph 16 from the Contract and substituting therefore the 
additional terms and conditions of the Escrow Instructions. 
7. On or about April 10, 1985, Birds sold their interest in the subject 
property to West Star Development Corporation, (West Star) a Utah corporation. 
8. That transaction was accomplished by the execution by Birds of a 
Warranty Deed which was delivered to West Star. 
9. Prior to answering the Complaint for Birds, Birds' attorney spoke with 
Mills' attorney on the phone and informed him that the addendum to the real 
estate contract included as an exhibit with the Amended Complaint was not the 
one signed by Birds nor included in the contract, that the one signed by Birds 
was materially different in that it did not provide for any remedy other than 
forfeiture and requested that Mills dismiss their Complaint against Birds as a 
result thereof and not require that Birds incur any further attorney's fees in 
defending the matter. Mills' attorney later communicated to Birds' attorney his 
knowledge of and familiarity with the correct addendum to the contract signed 
by Birds and in fact sent it to Birds' attorney to replace the incorrect one 
included with the Amended Complaint served on Birds. 
10. In both the telephone conversation and communications with the 
replacement exhibit, Mills' attorney required that Birds respond to the Complaint 
which Birds retained counsel to do and agreed to pay a reasonable fee therefor. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The deliberate deletion of the default remedies enumerated in the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into by the parties and the Addendum of 
the Contract giving an exclusive remedy of forfeiture limits the legal action for 
default to the forfeiture remedy. Additional remedies are unavailable. 
II. AttorneysT fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 should be 
awarded to the Birds under the circumstances of this case because this action 
was prosecuted in bad faith and without merit. The existing facts and case law 
clearly did not support the Mill's action. 
HI. Because this appeal is not only without merit but also without any 
basis in law or fact, Birds are entitled to single or double costs including 
reasonable attorneys fees for this appeal. 
IV. Birds relied to their detriment on the express terms of the contract 
as prepared by Mills or their agents in reselling the property on terms not 
including an indemnification from the buyer of their obligation to the Mills nor 
any collateral security interest in the property. Therefore, the Mills are 
equitably estopped from pursuing any remedy other than that of forfeiture 
provided in the Contract. 
V. The Mills elected a remedy by excluding others in the Contract and 
are bound to that election. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
I. MILLS ONLY REMEDY UNDER THEIR CONTRACT WITH BIRDS IS 
FORFEITURE OF THE CONTRACT DUE TO THEIR DELIBERATE STRIKING OUT 
OF OTHER ADDITIONAL REMEDIES. 
Mills focus their entire argument against the Courtfs decision on some 
claimed necessity that the forfeiture provision, which was the only remedy 
provided for in the Contract, must in and of itself state that it is the exclusive 
remedy and that the provision in paragraph 21 for payment of attorneys fees in 
the event other remedies are pursued in fact create those other remedies. Such 
may have been the case had there been some patent ambiguity in the Contract 
where the intent of the parties was not clear. 
However, an established and primary rule of contract law is that ". . . if 
the language of the contract is such that the intention of the parties is clearly 
and unequivocally expressed, if must be enforced according to its terms." 
Wingets, Incorporated v. Bitters, 500 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Utah 1972); citing, Jones v. 
Acme Building Products, Inc., 450 P.2d 743 (Utah 1969). 
Mills or their agents deliberately crossed out remedies enumerated in the 
Contract which were available to them in case Birds defaulted on the Contract, 
and substituted the exclusive remedy of forfeiture. Mills argue in their brief 
that this was a result of "a title officer's apparent belief that he was deleting 
only forfeiture provisions, etc.". Such was never presented as evidence by 
affidavit of Mills or any other and is improper to argue the whole change of the 
Contract to be the mistake of some title officer. Mills also argue that, because 
there was no actual discussion by the parties of the Contract, there is no 
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decision to delete all default provisions. If that were the general rule, there 
was no decision for Mills to have any remedies because it was never discussed. 
The actions of the parties in signing the Contract as changed indicates they had 
a clear and unequivocable intent to limit their remedies to those specifically 
included in the contract and to exclude those that were crossed out. Both 
parties agreed to these terms and because they are conclusive, the Court must 
give effect to the Contract as it is written, in the absence of fraud. Mills did 
not object to the uncontested facts as set out by Birds and it is clear that the 
intent of both parties was that Mills' remedies would be limited to what was 
specifically set out in the Contract, that of forfeiture. 
Mills cite two cases in support of their proposition that they are not 
limited by the remedies expressly set out in the Contract unless they are 
specifically stated to be the exclusive remedy. The holdings of these cases are 
not directly applicable to the present case and are not binding upon this Court. 
The two cases merely held that where one remedy is listed in the Contract, 
other remedies are not automatically precluded unless the one is stated to be the 
exclusive remedy. Neither case involved facts dealing with contracts such as the 
one present here, whereby Mills deliberately crossed out specific remedies and 
substituted others in their place, later attempting to reinvoke the invalidated 
remedies. They are clearly distinguishable from this case as there was an 
immense difference between a court refusing to limit remedies in the absence of 
language to the contrary and allowing deliberately crossed out remedies to be 
held actionable by Mills. 
In Wingets, Incorporated v. Bitters, 500 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1972), the 
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Supreme Court of Utah reviewed an action brought by seller of property against 
buyers for balance due on the contract price which seller had declared 
"immediately due and payable" on grounds the buyers were in default. The Court 
held that provisions of contracts should be construed most strictly against the 
party whose attorney drew the contract; especially when dealing with forfeitures. 
Id. at 1010. Mills did not dispute that the contract in question was prepared by 
their agent. Thus any questions of its construction should be construed strictly 
against them. 
Another pertinent observation made is that, where there is a choice, an 
interpretation which will bring about an equitable result will be preferred over a 
harsh or inequitable one. Id. at 1010; citing Jorgensen v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 
373 P.2d 580 (Utah 1962). It is clear that to grant Mills a remedy that was 
intentionally excluded from the contract would reach an inequitable result as 
more further presented in the argument number II following. 
Other jurisdictions, specifically Arizona, have supported the proposition 
that: 
[W]here parties bind themselves by a lawful contract, in the 
absence of fraud a court must give effect to the contract as it is 
written, and the terms or provisions of the contract where clear 
and unambiguous, are conclusive. . . . The intent of the parties 
must control the interpretation of a contract. It is not within the 
power of the court to alter, revise, modify, extend, rewrite, or 
remake an agreement. Its duty is confined to the construction or 
interpretation of the one which the parties have made for 
themselves. 
In Hall Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982) 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed that long-standing rule in Utah that "persons 
dealing at armrs length are entitled to contract on their own terms without the 
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intervention of the courts to relieve either party .from the effects of a bad 
bargain." Id. at 749; See, e.g., Biesinger v. Behunin, 584 P.2d 801 (Utah 1978). 
Additionally, courts will not rewrite a contract to supply terms which the parties 
omitted. Id. at 749. 
When applied to the case at hand, these rules indicate that terms which 
the plaintiff failed to include in the Contract can not be included at this late 
point in time. If Mills wished to leave open the way for remedies in addition to 
forfeiture, they should have stipulated it in the Contract. Here, Mills are even 
going beyond this point as they are not only asking the Court to allow remedies 
not mentioned in the Contract to be sought, but to actually revalidate provisions 
that Mills deliberately and intentionally invalidated by striking them out. For a 
court to allow such an injustice would definitely be an inequitable burden for 
the Birds to be forced to bear. 
In conclusion, the intentional striking of a remedy in the Contract 
excluded it from pursuit by Mills and neither the reference to them without 
actually providing for them in Paragraph 21, nor the absence of plain language 
in the forfeiture provision making it exclusive, can revive them. 
II. THE COURTS AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES UNDER SECTION 78-27-56 OF 
THE UTAH CODE IS JUSTIFIED. 
Mills argue that there were no facts presented to the Court by which it 
could find Mills1 case to be without merit and brought in bad faith. Such is not 
the case. 
In support of Birds' motion for summary judgment was filed not only 
Birds' affidavit but the affidavit of Birds' attorney (R.42, 44, 54, and 62). Such 
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affidavit was not contradicted in any way by Mills and therefore could be 
accepted by the Court as true facts. In summary, that affidavit set forth that 
Mills attached to the original complaint a contract with the wrong addendum for 
forfeiture attached. Mills1 counsel was informed of such and told by Birds' 
counsel that the true addendum did not provide for any remedy other than 
forfeiture and requested that Mills dismiss the complaint against Birds because of 
that. In spite of the clear knowledge of Mills and their counsel of the true 
addendum later submitted by them, which clearly showed forfeiture as the only 
remedy in the contract, they continue to pursue their case which the trial court 
has found was without merit. To bring a case totally lacking in merit when the 
only evidence is clear documentary evidence unambiguously excluding the action 
of Mills can be assumed as nothing but bad faith upon which the Court could 
award attorneys fees. There is nothing in the record to support appellant's 
claim that the delay in the Court's ruling on the motions for summary judgment 
was because of any difficulty of the legal issue. In fact, Mills' misstate the 
Court's response to the cross-motions in claiming that they were both denied 
when the case was set for trial. Such was not the case nor indicated in the 
record of the case. 
m. BIRDS ARE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES FOR THIS FRIVOLOUS APPEAL. 
Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals provides: 
If the Court determines that a motion made or an appeal taken 
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award 
such damages and single or double costs, including reasonable 
attorneys fees, to the prevailing party. 
The case of O'Brien v. Rush, (Utah App. 1987) 744 P.2d 306, 66 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 18, treated in detail Rule 33(a) and the requirements for costs and 
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attorneys fees to be awarded pursuant to it. Citing Cady v. Johnson, (Utah 
1983) 671 P.2d 149, the Court concluded that a frivolous appeal is one without 
merit. Additional guidance was given by Rule 40(a) of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals which states: 
The signature of an attorney or a party constitutes a certificate 
that the attorney or the party has read the motion, brief, or 
other papers; that to the best of the attorneys or the parties 
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable 
inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing 
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purposes, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay 
or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
The Court found such definition sufficiently objective that it could be 
applied without delving into the subjective intent of the parties and that there 
was no necessity of finding "bad faith,T to award attorneys fees. In conclusion, 
it held that with regard to claims that are not only without merit but are also 
without basis in law or fact, the respondent is entitled to the benefit of Rule 
33(a). 
This Honorable Court can see from the arguments of Mills' brief that 
they are based solely on two cases which are no where near consistent with the 
facts of this case and no other supporting precedent. The arguments are totally 
frivolous as the agreement between the parties was extremely clear and no 
question of the propriety of the trial courts decision. Therefore, Birds should be 
awarded single or double costs including reasonable attorneys fees for this 
appeal. 
IV. DEFENDANT HAS REASONABLY RELIED UPON THE CLEAR TERMS OF THE 
CONTRACT AND WOULD SUFFER INJUSTICE IF PLAINTIFF IS PERMITTED TO 
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REPUDIATE THESE TERMS. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel operates to prevent a party who has, 
without fault, been deluded into a course of action by the wrong or neglect of 
another. 
Estoppel arises when a party by his acts, representations . . . 
intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to 
believe certain facts to exist and that such other acting with 
reasonable prudence and diligence, relies and acts thereon so that 
he will suffer an injustice if the former is permitted to deny the 
existence of such facts. 
Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976); See also, United 
American Life v. Zions First National Bank, 641 P.2d 158 (Utah 1982). 
Birds in this case reasonably relied upon the clear and express terms of 
the Contract, which specifically set out the exclusive remedy of forfeiture in 
case Birds defaulted. As a result of their reasonable reliance on such express 
terms, Birds sold the property to co-defendants, West Star without any collateral 
or security or requirement of indemnification by such buyer of Birds1 obligations 
to Mills. Such was set forth in their affidavits in support of the motion for 
summary judgment. Such establishes a detrimental reliance on the clear and 
express terms of the agreement which should estop Mills from pursuing any 
remedy but that of forfeiture provided in the contract. 
V. MILLS KNOWLEDGEABLY ELECTED TO PURSUE A PARTICULAR REMEDY, 
EVINCING A PURPOSE TO FOREGO ALL OTHERS, AND UNDER THE ELECTION 
OF REMEDIES DOCTRINE THEY ARE PRECLUDED FROM SEEKING TO PURSUE 
A DIFFERENT AND INCONSISTENT REMEDY AT A LATER TIME. 
Mills do not contest the facA that Paragraph 16, which listed specific 
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remedies in case of default, was stricken in the Real Estate Contract, ft is also 
uncontested that beside Paragraph 16 there is specific reference to the Escrow 
Instructions, where there is one remedy listed, that of forfeiture. When Mills 
elected the specific remedy of forfeiture by striking out Paragraph 16 and 
inserting the Escrow Instructions instead, they made a choice to pursue a 
specific cause of action in case of default, and must forego seeking other 
remedies at a later time. 
In Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983), 
the Supreme Court of Utah held that: 
The doctrine of election of remedies is a technical rule of 
procedure and its purpose is not to prevent double redress for a 
single wrong. Said doctrine presupposes a choice between 
inconsistent remedies, a knowledgeable selection of one thereof, 
free of fraud or imposition, and a resort to the chosen remedy 
evincing a purpose to forego all others. 
Td. at 778; Citing, Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 
793, 796 (Utah 1979). 
Other jurisdictions further support this rule. The Court in Lehigh, Inc. 
v. Stevens, 468 P.2d 177 (Kansas 1970) discussed the doctrine of election of 
remedies and interpreted it to preclude a party who has elected to pursue a 
particular remedy, having full knowledge of the facts, from later pursuing a 
different and inconsistent remedy. Id. at 181. 
The application of the doctrine of election of remedies to the present 
case prevents Mills from pursuing an action to obtain a money judgment for the 
amounts due on the contract and should be limited to the exclusive remedy of 
forfeiture. Mills lost their right to seek remedies outside of forfeiture when 
deliberately striking them from the Contract, and alternatively inserting the 
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exclusive remedy of forfeiture. Birds relied upon the clear language of the 
Contract and would be injured if Mills were now allowed to repudiate the terms 
as originally agreed upon. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the face of the Uniform Real Estate Contract between 
Mills and Birds that all remedies of the Seller provided for in the Contract were 
stricken. It is also clear that from the face of the Contract that the exclusive 
remedies available to the Seller were contained in the Addendum to the Contract. 
The only remedy provision mentioned within the Addendum is the forfeiture 
remedy. There is no provision for any other remedies such as the specific 
performance sought by the Mills, suing for delinquent installments, or treatment 
of the Contract as a mortgage and foreclosing. Such being the clear meaning of 
the written agreement between Mills and Birds, the decision of the lower court 
should be affirmed. 
The court should also uphold the decision of the lower court in the 
awarding of attorney fees to the Birds. The action by the plaintiff was in bad 
faith and without merit. Also, the court should award attorney fees for services 
rendered in defending this frivolous appeal. 
ADDENDUM 
Birds will append to this brief copies of the following documents: 
1. Affidavit of Birds supporting their motion for summary judgment. 
2. Affidavit of Birds' attorney supporting the motion for summary 
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judgment. 
3, Minute Entry of the Court setting the case for trial without ruling on 
the motions for summary judgment. 
DATED this 12th day of May, 1988. 
0£ Attorneys for Respondents 
z^Dean S. Bird and Julie A. Bird 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
was mailed, postage prepaid, this '? r^day of May, 1988, to the following: 
West Star Development 
c/o Margaret Moore 
Registered Agent 
270 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Charles Moore 
143 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Evan A. Schmutz 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
re brf 
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o^iu i 
E. Craig McAllister, No. 2138 
E . CRAIG MCALLISTER & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Dean S. Bird and Julie A. Bird 
One East Center Street, Suite 303 
Post Office Box 1372 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: 375-8891 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
THOMAS D. MILLS and 
GAYLE J. MILLS, AFFIDAVIT OF DEAN S. BIRD 
AND JULIE A. BIRD 
Plaintiffs, 
v . Civil No. 86 CV 698 
CHARLES MOORE: WEST STAR 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation; DEAN S. 
BIRD and JULIE A. BIRD, 
Defendants. 
/ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
s s . 
County of Utah ) 
We, Dean S. Bird and Julie A. Bird, upon oath duly sworn, state: 
1. We are defendants herein and have personal knowledge of the 
facts stated herein. 
2 . On or about October 1, 1981 plaintiffs entered into a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract (the Contract) with us attached hereto as Exhibit 
A and made a part hereof by this reference. 
3 . At the time the Contract was signed by the parties paragraph 
16 had been stricken as it appears in the copy and the notation made 
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in the margin with reference to the Escrow Instructions attached 
hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated herein by this reference. 
4. Plaintiffs designated Zion National Title, Inc. to prepare 
the above documents. 
5. The only conversation or communication that we had with 
plaintiffs prior to signing the above documents was a meeting with Mr. 
Mills several weeks prior to signing contracts and it was not concerning 
the documents themselves but the general terms of the transaction, not 
including the remedies of the Seller in the event of default. 
6. The Contract and Escrow Instructions were signed by plain-
tiffs outside our presence and there was no communication or 
discussion between plaintiffs and us at that time. 
7. After plaintiffs signed the documents, they were delivered to 
us at our home by Mike Hallock of Zion National Title, Inc. for 
signing at which time we signed them. At the time Mike Hallock of 
Zion National Title, Inc. brought the documents to our home to sign 
them, there was no conversation, discussion or other communication 
between us and Mr. Hallock regarding the striking of paragraph 16 from 
the Contract and substituting therefore the additional terms and con-
ditions of the Escrow Instructions. 
8. On or about April 10, 1985 we sold our interest in the sub-
ject property to West Star Development Corporation, (West Star) a Utah 
corporation. 
9. That transaction was accomplished by the execution by us of 
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a Warranty Deed which was delivered to West Star attached hereto as 
Exhibit C and incorporated herein by this reference. 
10. Because the Contract signed between plaintiffs and us elimi-
nated all remedies for default except forfeiture, the only recourse 
which we secured against West Star in our transaction was a Promissory 
Note for the amount of our equity in the property. We secured no 
recourse against West Star for default under our contract with plain-
tiffs nor any collateral to secure West Star's performance of our 
contract with plaintiff. 
DATED /'i/'s'i / 
/ 
^ 
JJMX, £ • 
Dean S. Bird 
\ //,/„ 
•''* <?<<., J 
Julie A. Bird 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on fit,;' 7. /•#(. . 
Residing at: (^ ; — <^ (/?' . 
Commission expires: \/J •>!,*' 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
/ 
I i 
7 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true $nd correct copy of the foregoing was 
mailed, postage prepaid this j T ^ i a y of May, 1986, to the following: 
Evan S.Schmutz 
Robert A. Goodman 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
m/1 bi4 
and which may 'become due orT thrst premises dunnf tht lift of this tfrttmeni. Tht Sfltcr hereby covenants tndagretf 
E. Craig McAllister, No. 2138 
E . CRAIG MCALLISTER & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Dean S. Bird and Julie A. Bird 
One East Center Street, State 303 
Post Office Box 1372 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: 375-8891 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
THOMAS D. MILLS and 
GAYLE J . MILLS, AFFIDAVIT OF 
E . CRAIG MCALLISTER 
Plaintiffs, 
v . Civil No. 86 CV 698 
CHARLES MOORE: WEST STAR 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation; DEAN S. 
BIRD and JULIE A. BIRD, 
Defendants. 
I 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
s s . 
County of Utah ) 
I, E. Craig McAllister upon oath duly sworn, state: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of 
Utah and have a personal knowledge of the facts stated herein. 
2 . Prior to answering the Complaint for defendants, I spoke with 
plaintiffs' attorney on the phone and informed him that the Addendum 
to the Uniform Real Estate Contract included as an exhibit with the 
Amended Complaint served on defendants was not the one signed by 
defendants nor included in the Contract, that the one signed by defen-
1 
dants was materially different in that it did not provide for any 
remedy other than forfeiture and requested that plaintiffs dismiss 
their Complaint against defendants as a result thereof. Plaintiffs1 
attorney later communicated to me his knowledge of and familiarity 
with the correct Addendum to the Contract signed by defendants and in 
fact sent that to me to replace the incorrect one included with the 
Amended Complaint served on defendants. 
3 . In both his telephone conference with me and his com-
munication to me with the replacement exhibit, plaintiffs" attorney 
required that defendants respond to the Complaint which defendants 
retained counsel to do and agreed to pay a reasonable fee therefore. 
4 . In defending defendants Dean and Julie Bird in this matter I 
have taken the following actions: 
4/16/86 Review of file and legal research 
abt action .6 h r s . 
4/17/86 Phone conf with clients and plain-
tiffs1 attorney abt the case .6 h r s . 
4/18/86 Conf w/ clients abt the case 1.0 hrs . 
4/30/86 Diet of ltr to plaintiffs1 atty 
re: answer .2 hrs . 
5/01/86 Phone conf with plaintiffs1 atty 
and clients; diet of answer, 
motion for sum. judgment, memo, 
of points and auth. k affidavits 1.4 h r s . 
5/06/86 Review and rev. of memo, of 
points and authorities and 
affidavits and conf with clients .4 h r s . 
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5. A reasonable attorneyfs fee therefore is $378.00. 
DATED this 7th day of May, 1986. 
~E. Craig McAllister 
Of Attorneys for Dean S. Bird 
and Julie A. Bird 
/ 
/ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on *77/^c: 7 I ISC-* 
S* If 
Residing a t : : ^ " , - : -
Commission expires: < / - / - ?Z 
%.*. IP*,. 
NOTARY PUBLIC ^7/ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
mailed, postage prepaid this J day of May, 1986, to the following: 
Evan S.Schmutz 
Robert A. Goodman 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
m/1 bi5 
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EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
THOMAS D. MILLS and 
GAYLE J. MILLS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES MOORE: WEST STAR 
DEVELOPMENT CORP., DEAN S. BIRD 
and JULIE A. BIRD, 
Defendant. 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the above entitled case is set for 
TRIAL on the 15th day of JUNE, 1987 at 9:00 o'clock A.M. 
in the Courtroom of the Eighth Circuit Court, Provo Department, 
359 West Center, Provo, Utah. 
By order of the Court, Trial is set for the above time and date. 
Kimberly Relf 
Deputy Clerk 
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Notice of Setting 
were mailed, postage prepaid, on this 29th day of April, 1987, to 
the following interested parties: 
Evan Schmutz-170 South Main Street, SLC, UT 84101 
West Star Development-270 E. 900 S., SLC, UT 84111 
Charles Moore-143 E. 900 S., SLC, UT 84111 
E. Craig McAllister-One E. Center, #303, Provo, UT 84601 
NOTICE OF SETTING 
Case No. 86 CV 698 
Kimberly Relf 
Deputy Clerk 
